



Political Science

Literature Review Sample

Democracy, as this term is commonly used (in the sense of liberal democracy), is a shortened denominator for a particular mixed rule. It is special in that it includes the autonomy of each of its members, regularly guaranteed by human rights, which is only possible if it is guaranteed by independent courts. Thus, the power is mixed in that it has three components: democratic (the power of all members of the political community, directly, i.e. by referendum, or indirectly, i.e. by the election of representatives and / or the like); aristocratic (power of judges, attorneys, and other legal and other professions performed by public services, jurisprudence); monarchy (monarch's functions have not only the head of the executive power of the political community but, within their autonomy, each member of the community alone). More importantly, this mixed rule is essentially legal because it is only possible to the extent that it is legally - regularly constitutional - founded and implemented. Therefore, the necessary ways of identifying (identifying) and hence the recognition of democracy is the right and legal science. But they are not enough. Capitalism, which cannot be recognized without other social sciences (primarily the political economy), is a condition - both positive and negative - (liberal) democracy: until now it has only appeared in capitalist states; Since the end of the 18th century, when it emerged, by the end of the 19th century, democracy was only for the class of the possessor, more precisely, it was an oligarchy; if it has a historical meaning at all, it is the protection of the minority of the majority, and not of any minority - as many believe today - but the minorities of the rich (Allot, 2003, 324); and before the economic crisis that broke out in 2008, the liberal democrats did not have a lonely view of the following: "Despite our obsessed twentieth-century speech of 'democracy', the notion of democracy can no longer bridge the gap between the ideal of democracy and its social reality" (ibid., 326); the current crisis made it easier to accept the findings that the gap stems, irrespective of its ultimate causes, of economic inequality (Stiglitz, 2012; Mount, 2012) that exist - with somewhat short-term alleviations - since capitalism has stagnated (Piketty, 2014). Maturation is also an abbreviated denominator, but for miscellaneous events. In history, philosophy has three meanings (Sommer, 1984, 225). Originally, the relationship of the German chief of the house to the people, i.e. the wives, the children and the servants, who, after the reception of Roman law, is acquired by a legal act of emancipation, i.e. the release of a child or a servant from the fatherly authority (Brunner, 1906). A man may even come up without a legal act, so he alone, regardless of legal age, arranges himself. Although capitalism is a condition of democracy, the condition of it is not a mechanical growth of production relations and production power. In Latin America, John Ilich, forty years ago, had not yet been lowered "the curtains of childhood" between the night watchman and his eleven-year-old son who made money as a helper, so it was unusual when Ilich's son called his father before his father (Ilich, 2000, 21). In England, James Joyce, nine decades ago, that curtain had already dropped there, but not so much to make the adult dependent on the other. The most prolific Samsonite in England was "All I paid for. I never borrowed or shill in my life ... I do not owe anything" (Joyce, 2012, 54). Maturation is, metaphorically, and historically. Enlightenment by analogy concludes from the natural maturation of the child to the historical maturation of mankind, finding that it also advances, from the natural state in which it is immature, in the enlightened and emancipated state. Enlightenment is the departure of man from a state of self-concealed immaturity. Ruthlessness is the inability to use your own mind without leadership. This immaturity is self-sacrificed when its cause lies not in the lack of reason, but in the lack of determination and courage to serve it without any other management. Culture is notoriously one of the most complex and most controversial concepts (Muench and Smelser, 1992). He has all the features of the essentially blatant notion in the sense determined

by Gallie: it is judiciously to mark or attribute some sort of valuable achievement; this achievement has a complex internal significance in that sense that value is attributed to achievement as a whole; any explanation of it must include a reference to the possible yields of some of its parts, since no attempt is possible before any attempt is made, either of which is entirely possible in different ways to show the contributions of individual parts of the whole, to say it is contradictory or absurd; it is attributed to the achievement that it is possible that only under significant changes in the changed circumstances; not only that different people accept different standards of correct use of the notion that everyone admits that its use of the concept is disputed by others and everyone at least barely appreciates the criteria on the basis of which another uses that term (Gallie, 1956: 171-172). Galius's conclusion is that, although it is necessary to take into account the differences in the content of a particular concept and its history, the successful use of an essentially blunt term must take account of other uses. That is why this term, as stated in the introduction, is built in five steps. Three approaches to the study of social problems, namely, classical (ontological), modern (epistemological) and contemporary (linguistic) are cognitively useful. Culture cannot be non-trivially defined within the latter, because within it, all human creations are parts of culture. The notion of culture derived within an ontological tradition will probably be too specific (it will involve religion and art) and therefore not sufficiently comprehensive (it will not include philosophy).

Therefore, perhaps the most promising modern approach is promised. That's the first step. The modern stand is epistemological. According to it, the research method is one that determines the subject matter of the research. The method of any culture science (e.g. linguistics, history - general or any special, such as the history of law, legal or moral dogmatics to the extent that each of them is culture science, etc.) is by definition defined by research of phenomena that are irreplaceable in at least one of two ways. The first is that each of these phenomena is a consequence of unimaginable reasons (e.g. Da Vinci's Mona Lisa, World War I, any precedent). The second is that it is the consequence of such unforeseeable causes (in the following examples: Da Vinci's inspiration.) So understood, cultural phenomena can be studied in two mutually exclusive ways: cultural and naturalistically. The first is that by studying similar phenomena within one culture on the one hand, the scales (rules, values, principles, institutions, systems, etc.) that are in themselves the reasons for action and this justification for action itself, and other criteria (social norms, laws and legality) explaining why or and the second (further explanations and / or causes) are the ideal types. Ideal-type is the court (including the term whose content is defined) with experience (e.g. use of the concept of culture and its application), which has no real value but cognitive fertility, i.e. no evidence concludes nor is it reprehensible with experience, but is more or less cognitively fertile, until it explains a significant part of the phenomenon that arises in that court for their explanation (Weber, 1968; Saegesser, 1975). By the same pattern it is possible to compare two cultures or cultural phenomena of diachronicity (e.g., Croatian culture before and after World War II) and synchronously (e.g. today's Croatian and Serbian culture), but only to the extent that these occur and cultures belonging to possible denominations to a common denominator - and possibly to the extent that they are relevant to research (where qualification of some phenomenon is significant, e.g. Da Vinci's inspiration or Mona Lisa, the central problem of the culturalist mode). The naturalistic way is that, after a certain cultural event, certain unavoidable occurrences are reduced to a common denominator (e.g. laws and sentences on the punishment of family offenders) and this phenomenon is explained by natural phenomena and / or cultural phenomena, which are also reduced to a common denominator (for example, to

explain the laws and sentences of punishment of family offenders to illnesses or cultures of the offender). Culturally, i.e. as society or socially, i.e. that part of the world that is different from nature or natural in that for social phenomena we assume that each is attributable, quantifiable or accountable to some unavoidable cause, i.e. a social worker, regardless of whether the social worker is an individual and / or a group, we consider that as a natural phenomenon they are part of an infinite series of causes and consequences, i.e. they are understood naturalistic. Although such a distinction is often simple, in the reality is the source of almost all the debates about a man. First in everyday life, in the self-consciousness of people begins with anthropomorphism, i.e. by attributing to all phenomena beyond human unavoidable causes, therefore, humanity (Kelsen, 1942). Others in philosophy and science, especially social sciences, which, especially when they are perceived in the singular as social science, "a philosophically viewed form of" actually existing naturalism, "which explains or attempts to explain the objects for which philosophers traditionally believed to be explicit within the realm of reason for themselves (Turner and Roth, 2003, 13). Thus, social sciences, by their assumptions, are inevitably at least partially physiomorphic, i.e. attributed to interpersonal relationships that the chain is in principle an infinite series of causes. The practical consequences of the confrontation between humanism and naturalism are most likely to be debated when criminal proceedings are being debated whether the defendant is countable or not.

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